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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
INTERNATIONAL LAW-CHICAGO CONVENTION
INTERPRETED-DISCRIMINATORY AIRPORT
CHARGES TO FOREIGN AIRLINES
The defendant, Dade County Port Authority, owns and operates
Miami International Airport. The plaintiffs, tbn Latin American airline
corporations which have made substantial use of the airport facilities in
international operations during recent years, sought recovery of alleged
excessive charges for airport use, and injunctive relief, premised on
Article 15 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The trial
court decreed that the charges could be no higher to the plaintiffs than
the lowest charges paid by American nationals, no matter what the
classification. On appeal, held, reversed: the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, providing that each public airport in contracting states
was to be open under uniform conditions to aircraft of other contracting
states, did not entitle foreign airlines to the benefit of lower charges fixed
by contract to certain domestic airlines before the effective date of the
treaty. Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, 307 F.2d
802 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 371 U.S. 961 (1962).
The Convention on International Civil Aviation,' the "Chicago
Convention," became effective as a treaty2 between the contracting
states' on April 4, 1947 by ratification of more than the required number
of nations, including the United States.4 As a treaty, the Chicago Con-
vention is binding on all courts, state and national, as the supreme law
of the land.' Therefore, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by
which the rights of private citizens or subjects may be determined, and
1. "International agreements assume various forms and are given various descriptive
designations, such as treaties, conventions, . . " 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (1943). See generally SCIIENKMAN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
68-106 (1955). For historical aspects of the Convention, see Sand, Lyon & Pratt, An His-
torical Survey of International Air Law Since 1944, 7 McGIL L. REV. 125 (1961).
2. "In the United States Constitution the term 'treaty' is applied to any international
agreement, however denominated, which becomes binding upon the United States through
ratification by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, two thirds of the
Senators present concurring therein." BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1962).
3. The nations of which plaintiffs are subjects are ratifying states. The plaintiffs are
Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. ("APA"), Aerolineas Peruanas, S.A. ("APSA"),
Compania Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. ("CEA"), Empresa Guatemalteca de Aviacion, SA.
("AVIATECA"), Empresa de Transportes Aerovia Brasil, S.A. ("REAL"), Guest Aerovias
Mexico, S.A. ("GUEST"), Lloyd Aereo Colombiano ("LLOYD"), Rutas Aereas Nacionales,
S.A. ("RANSA"), Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. ("TAN"), and Lineas Aereas de
Nicaragua, S.A. ("LANICA").
4. Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Convention].
5. The United States Constitution expressly defines the status of treaties of the United
States in the following provision:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. CoNsT. art VI, § 2.
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when those rights are of the nature to be enforced in a court of justice,
the court resorts to the treaty as it would to a statute, for a rule of
decision applicable to the case before it.' Article 15 of the Chicago Con-
vention7 provides that charges for the use of a domestic airport to the
nationals of all other contracting states shall not be higher than those
that would be paid by domestic aircraft engaged in similar international
air services. Article 15, in stating this rule, provides for "national treat-
ment,"' meaning that the nationals of one of the contracting states shall
be treated in the territory of the other contracting state as if they were
nationals of that state.'
The difficulty encountered in the instant case is inherent in the
interpretation of the Article 15 phrase, "shall not be higher . . than those
that would be paid by its national aircraft . . . ,,o because not one, but
two separate schedules of charges were effective at the airport. One
schedule was based on contracts" made at or near the time the airport
opened for business in 1946, and the other on Resolution 5612 of the
6. Malorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268 (1909), affirming 216 Pa. 402, 65
AUt. 1077 (1907); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Edye v. Robertson,
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
7. Convention, supra note 4, at 1184 provides in Article 15:
Any charges tha may be imposed or permitted to be imposed by a contracting State
for the use of such airports and air navigation facilities by the aircraft of any
other contracting State shall not be higher,
(a) As to aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services, than those
that would be paid by its national aircraft of the same class engaged in similar
operations, and (b) As to aircraft engaged in scheduled international air services,
than those that would be paid by its national aircraft engaged in similar interna-
tional air services.
8. See Bayitch, Conflict Law in United States Treaties, 8 MIAi L.Q. 501, 516 (1954).
9. See McNAiR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 273 (1961).
10. "When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be done, or that certain
limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties,
the compact does not need to be supplemented by legislative or executive action .... .
Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697 (1878). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R.
1377, 1387 (1919). An interesting interpretation of the self-executing nature of Article
15 is developed by Rijks, Airport Charges Under Judicial Review, 9 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
50, 59 (1962). See generally 5 HACKWORTH, DIEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-85 (1943) ;
Henry, When is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MIcH. L. REv. 776 (1929); Comment, 48 MIcH.
L. REV. 852 (1950).
11. Pan American Airlines, Inc., Eastern Airlines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., Delta
C & S Airlines, Inc., and TACA Airways Agency, Inc., a corporation of El Salvador, all
accepted identical leases which provided in part, for similar schedules of landing charges.
Rental for space used was on a square foot basis and was equal for all airlines including
the plaintiffs. TACA Airways Agency, Inc. terminated Miami service on February 10, 1948.
12. The Airport Manager on March 18, 1946, publicly announced the opening of opera-
tions on March 23, 1946, for aircraft in domestic service only. Attached was a schedule
of tariffs applicable to those airlines who would not commit themselves to the comprehensive
long-term contracts. On September 24, 1946, the Authority, by its Resolution 56, issued
a permanent schedule of tariffs applicable to all aircraft "except aircraft of lessees whose
charges have been established by contract prior to the adoption of this Resolution." The
resolution reduced the prior schedule of landing charges. However, under Resolution 56 and
the prior schedule other airport charges are imposed which are not imposed on the aircraft
of the contracting lessees. They are:
(1) $.50 per passenger terminal charge,
(2) $2.00 per ton cargo terminal charge,
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Port Authority setting charges applicable to all aircraft except those of
the "Big Four," the carriers who were parties to the contracts. The
question arises whether foreign carriers invoking national treatment
must accept local law as they find it, including discriminatory18 provi-
sions applicable to domestic carriers. "The other alternative would be to
treat the foreign carriers as belonging to the most favored class of
domestic carriers automatically, despite the fact that under local law
they might not fit in this class." 4 There appears to be no previous
judicial interpretation of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, nor of
Article 82.18 Therefore, in construing the Convention, the court followed
the rules of treaty interpretation promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court."0
The court, in the instant case, in determining that the cause of the
foreign air carriers must fail, rested its rationale on two grounds. First,
Article 82 of the Convention 17 recognized the possibility of outstanding
inconsistencies at the time the treaty would take effect and required
the use of the best efforts by the contracting states to secure their
elimination."8 The court observed that there was nothing in the Con-
vention which would deprive the contracting air carriers of the fruits of
their bargain made "before" the treaty became effective, nor which would
require the Port Authority to afford the same bargain to the foreign air
carriers. Therefore, it reasoned, in applying Article 82 to the instant
(3) 5% indirect surcharge on all aviation gasoline and oil, and
(4) 5% indirect surcharge on all meals to be served aloft, and purchased at the
airport.
The judgment entered by the trial court for "excess airport charges" paid by plaintiffs
and their suppliers since 1955 aggregated approximately $748,800.
13. Article 44 of the Convention provides, as one of the duties of the International
Civil Aviation Organization, that it operate to "avoid discrimination between contracting
States." (Emphasis added.) Convention, supra note 4, at 1193.
14. Bayitch, International Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 240, 259 (1961).
15. See text accompanying note 17 infra.
16. E.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332 (1924) ; Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903) ; United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1
(1896); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 154 n.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
17. Convention, supra note 4, at 1203 provides in Article 82:
The contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all obligations and
understandings between them which are inconsistent with its terms, and undertake
not to enter into any such obligations and understandings. A contracting State
which, before becoming a member of the Organization has undertaken any obliga-
tions toward a non-contracting State or a national of a contracting State or of
a non-contracting State inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, shall take
immediate steps to procure its release from the obligations. If an airline of any
contracting State has entered into any such inconsistent obligations, the State
of which it is a national shall use its best efforts to secure their termination
forthwith and shall in any event cause them to be terminated as soon as such action
can lawfully be taken after the coming into force of this Convention.
18. The latter two provisions of Article 82, note 16 supra, refer to agreements between
a state and a private national and between two private nationals. Although there is a
dearth of law and writing in this area, a treaty by itself appears not to be self-executing in
cutting off private rights arising under contracts. The two provisions are probably only
persuasive as they do not specifically call for legislative action.
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case, since the treaty was effective immediately except as to outstanding
inconsistencies, Article 15 would not become completely effective until
the termination of the outstanding contracts. Termination could be ac-
complished either by action on the part of the United States government
or upon the expiration of the contracts under their terms. Since neither
of these had transpired, the contracts remained in force.
Second, upon analyses of three decisions of the United States
Supreme Court,'9 the court concluded that most-favored-nation clauses
20
were sometimes rendered inapplicable "in situations where exceptions are
made for valuable consideration." A most-favored-nation clause in a pro-
vision of a treaty between two contracting states permits a national of one
contracting state, within the territory of the other party, to be afforded
the most favorable treatment in an agreed area of law granted by the
other contracting state to nationals of third states with which it has
made treaties, simply by invoking these third-nation treaties." The court
considered the logic of the cases "compelling" and their opinions "con-
trolling" the instant case to the effect that most-favored-nation clauses
were not intended to interfere with special arrangements based upon
19. A treaty between the United States and the king of the Hawaiian Islands provided
for the importation of certain Hawaiian products into the United States duty free in
exchange for duty free importation of certain United States products into the Islands.
Plaintiffs, importers of sugar from a Danish possession, sought a refund of duties paid on
sugar based on a favored nation provision in a treaty between United States and
Denmark which stated: "no higher or other duties" shall be charged by the United States
on the importation of a Danish product "than are or shall be payable on the like article
being the product or manufacture of any other foreign country." Plaintiffs claimed to be
entitled to the privileges conceded to the Hawaiian Islands. The Court determined that "the
treaty with Denmark does not bind the United States to extend to that country, without
compensation, privileges which they have conceded to the Hawaiian Islands in exchange for
valuable concessions." Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 121 (1887). The court held
similarly in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), and Kelly v. Hedden, 124 U.S. 196
(1888), which involved the same question as it related to duty on sugar from the Dominican
Republic and a treaty with that country.
20. A most-favored-nation clause in a provision of a treaty between two contracting
states makes the nationals of these states third party beneficiaries of other treaties made by
each contracting state with third states. The third party beneficiary result obtains when-
ever the other treaties contain provisions covering the same privileges dealt with in the
provision containing the most-favored-nation clause. See Bayitch, Conflict Law in United
States Treaties, 8 MiAmi L.Q. 501, 519 (1954); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 536
(1947); 5 HACiKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 501 (1943).
21. This is a general statement of most-favored-nation treatment which impliedly re-
jects the "view that each State must give some compensation in order that its nationals shall
be entitled under the clause to the benefits of concessions made to other States." McNAIR,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 275. However, the treaty between Denmark and the United States
in the Bartram case differed, for it provided for conditional most-favored-nation treatment,
which is explained in 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1941):
Favored-nation clauses in treaties . . . may be either . . . conditional or uncondi-
tional ...... "Under the conditional clause, favors which either party to the treaty
grant to a third country accrue to the other party to the treaty when the favor
to the third country is granted freely, but do not accrue if the favor be granted
for a consideration unless the other party to the treaty proffer an equivalent con-
sideration: under the unconditional clause all favors granted by either party to third
countries accrue to the other party irrespective of questions of consideration or
equivalents."
1963]
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sufficient consideration with other states. It reasoned that the cases con-
sidered together "teach that there may be exceptions to such clauses where
based on valuable considerations. 22 The court deemed this consideration
to be present in the instant case since the "Big Four" had contracted to
share in the profits of the airport, and sustain it in losses for as long as
the Port Authority desired. It thereby concluded that the foreign car-
riers could not invoke rights on a most-favored-nation basis as long as
the contracts continued.
It would appear that since the court found Article 82 applicable, it
could only have done so by determining that the contracts were agree-
ments inconsistent with the Convention. But to so determine, it should be
necessary to show where and in what way the contracts conflicted with
the Convention. The point of incidence of the contracts with the Conven-
tion is at Article 15, which provides for national treatment with respect
to landing charges. The court, however, seems to have placed the cart
before the horse by applying Article 82 first; then, reasoning that "having
taken this view of the case, we do not reach the question of ... landing
fees . ., "I' it failed to show the requisite inconsistency.
The second ground for reversal appears to be burdened with some
misunderstandings by the appellate tribunal. Article 15 provides national
treatment (not most-favored-nation treatment) for any national of a
contracting state within the territory of the United States. This treatment,
in effect, annuls his "alien" status and places him "in the shoes" of a
United States national.24 The trial court in interpreting Article 15 seems
not to have placed any of the foreign carriers in the shoes of a United
States national. If it had, it would have been faced with fitting the foreign
carriers into one of two classes then in existence at the airport and rec-
ognized under local law with respect to United States nationals.25
National treatment does not require slipping a treaty alien into the most
favorable class existing under local law. In so doing local law would be
rewritten. It would permit a treaty alien to receive the most favorable
treatment granted to a national, i.e., greater rights than United States
nationals, who must qualify to fall into either class under local laws.26
The trial court effectively granted admittance to the most favorable class
by enjoining the airport from assessing the foreign carriers any charges
greater than would be charged had they entered identical contracts,27
22. Board of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, 307 F.2d 802, 808 (5th
Cir. 1962).
23. Ibid.
24. Bayitch, supra note 20.
25. One class was a closed class made up of four sustaining domestic carriers under
lease contracts, while the other was open to all carriers not under contract but paying
uniform charges under Resolution 56.
26. In June, 1955, Braniff International Airway, Inc., a United States airline flying
internationally, sought exemption from the provisions of Resolution 56. Its petition to the
Port Authority was denied.
27. Aerovias Interam. De Panama v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230,
255 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
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and it thereby created a fictitious treatment, which could be termed "most
favored national treatment."
The appellate court appears to have searched for some exception
to "most favored national treatment" and found case law permitting
exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment. One is hard pressed to
find the juncture of most-favored-nation law with the instant case.
Neither Article 15 nor any provision of the Convention contain a most-
favored-nation clause in its technical sense. 8 Going further, a treaty
alien must invoke a third-nation treaty to avail himself of most-favored-
nation treatment; the contracts between the "Big Four" and the Port
Authority, although providing the "consideration" for the court's ratio
decidendi, cannot be invoked as if they were a third-nation treaty between
sovereign states. Lastly, conditional-most-favored-nation treatment, which
permitted exceptions to most-favored-nation treatment when valuable
consideration was exchanged29 in the third-nation treaty invoked, has
been abondoned.8 0 In contrast, unconditional-most-favored-nation treat-
ment appears to have been the United States policy since 1923.81
The result reached in the instant case appears to be sound. The
rationale supporting the decision, however, seems to depart markedly
from the real issue: whether foreign carriers invoking national treatment
must accept local law as they find it, including discriminatory provisions
applicable to domestic carriers. It is unfortunate that this issue involving
the interpretation of Article 15 was side-stepped and that certain funda-
mental concepts of international law appear to have been misunderstood.
In aviation law, where there are so many international conventions and
treaties, it would be indeed desirable if a means of acquiring a uniform
interpretation of these agreements were available.82
WILLiAM R. GROVE, JR.
28. The first draft of Article 15 contained a most-favored-nation clause which appears
to have been replaced by the present clause in order to insure a more direct application
of the provision. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIvIL AVIATION CONFERENCE 1383
(1947).
29. Note that it is very difficult to determine the amount and nature of a consideration
given in an original treaty in view of the fact that such treaties generally do not contain
just one but a number of mutually interconnected privileges. Bayitch, supra note 20,
at 520.
30. "[T]he doctrine of the conditional most-favored-nation clause was abandoned
altogether, starting with the treaty with Germay (1923) as to commercial matters . . . .
Ibid. See 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 21, at 57.
31. "In 1923 the United States embarked upon a new treaty-making policy by
embodying in its treaties subsequently concluded the unconditional most-favored-nation
provisions." 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 21, at 57.
32. "When dealing with the subject of uniform interpretation of private air law
conventions, H. Drion has drawn attention to the possibility of requesting advisory opinions
from the International Court of Justice, to which the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization-as a specialized agency of the United Nations-is entitled. No doubt this
possibility also exists with respect to public air law conventions like the Chicago Con-
vention . . . . " Rijks, supra note 10, at 61. See Drion, Towards a Uniform Interpretation
of the Private Air Law Conventions, 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 423 (1952). Note, however,
